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Introduction
In 2003, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) finalized a change in market structure with the introduction of Autoquote, an automated trading system. The findings of Hendershott et al. (2011) show that this change had a large impact on the cost of trading. Not only did the transition to Autoquote lower spreads, but it also facilitated algorithmic trading in a major way. The bid-ask spreads and other measures of the market impact of trading decreased markedly in 2003. The finding of Hendershott et al. is illustrated in Figure 1 , where we show the evolution over time of Amihud's (2002) illiquidity measure, a proxy for the price impact of trading and used throughout this paper. We can clearly see that the costs of trading and associated liquidity of the stock market improved drastically after 2003. One likely group of market participants that is expected to be influenced by this general and widespread improvement in stock trading, are hedge funds. Equity-oriented hedge funds are known for their dynamic trading strategies and the advent of electronic trading has seen a surge of interest in algorithmic trading, much of which is performed by hedge funds. In this paper we study the relationship between the stock market exposure of hedge funds and market liquidity and test whether it changed over time, specifically before and after 2003.
Hedge funds assets have grown tremendously the last decade, but their short average lifespan and lavish compensation of managers begs the question of the real benefits to the financial system. The disappointing performance over the credit crisis, their role in bidding up CDO prices, as well as the alleged short selling of bank's shares during the crisis, makes the question of the sources of performance and systematic risk all the more relevant.
The systematic risk of hedge funds is not straightforward to measure. Hedge funds can change exposures quickly or use derivatives so that the relationships with traditional asset classes is highly nonlinear, see example Fung and Hsieh (1997) , Agarwal and Naik (2004) , Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) , Fung and Hsieh (2001) , Bollen and Whaley (2009) . Also, there are issues in reported returns, such as survivor and backfill-bias The graph shows the monthly median of Amihud's ILLIQ measure for all the stocks in the S&P 500, S&P 400 (Midcap) and S&P 600 (Smallcap), respectively. (Posthuma and Sluis (2003) ,Liang (2000)), serial correlation due to valuation models for illiquid assets, return smoothing or outright misreporting (Getmansky et al. (2004) , Asness et al. (2001) , Bollen and Pool (2009) ). In addition, the relatively short lifespan of hedge funds prohibits modeling the time-variation in exposure to many risk factors.
Thus, like in Patton (2009) we restrict our study of changing market exposure to the US stock market as a risk factor for hedge funds.
Patton (2009) finds some evidence that market neutrality is time-varying. Also, Sadka (2009) suggests that the outperformance of hedge funds can be partly explained by their high exposure to innovations in market liquidity. Thus, while hedge fund trading strategies generally lead to a low systematic risk relative to a broad US stock index, a time-varying component might remain, possibly caused by the impact of market illiquidity on profit opportunities and feasibility of trade strategies. In times of liquidity crises, hedge funds are particularly hurt by the low liquidity, be it driven by limits to arbitrage or the drying-up of funding, see Ben-David et al. (2010) and Aragon and Strahan (2010) .
The interaction between market liquidity and systematic risk is related to the issue of systemic risk. On the one hand, there is a clear positive role for hedge funds as providers of liquidity, or even 'lenders of last resort ' (Brophy et al. (2009) ). On the other hand, hedge funds receive some blame for financial turmoil like the Asian crisis of 1997 or the dot-com bubble of 2000. Although in both cases no dominant role for hedge funds can be proven, see Brown et al. (2000) and Brunnermeier and Nagel As Patton (2009) suggests, we have only few choices in choosing a 'market' variable for market exposure. The median lifespan of a hedge fund is quite short so our market model needs to be parsimonious. We follow Patton in taking the return on the S&P 500 as the market return. We test the sensitivity of our results with the S&P 400 (MidCap) and S&P 600 (SmallCap).
Our paper is related to the work of Patton (2009), who operationalizes several neutrality measures for hedge funds, relative to the S&P 500. We complement this line of research by examining the impact of market liquidity on the ability of hedge funds to maintain a market neutral profile. Further, there has been a lot of interest in recent literature on modeling time variations in hedge fund risk exposures. Bollen and Whaley (2009) apply an optimal change-point regression that allows for discrete shifts in parameter values. They find that this parsimonious specification outperforms a stochastic beta model that is in general unable to capture discrete shifts in factor loadings. Patton and Ramadorai (2010) employ a similar methodology, enhanced by introducing high frequency variations in the conditioning variables. Both studies concentrate on explaining the dynamics of optimal exposures over a vast array of candidate factors.
In this paper we focus exclusively on hedge fund market exposure and its interactions with market-wide liquidity. Cao et al. (2009) impact on market liquidity, has undergone a structural change in the beginning of the 21st century. Implementing a pairs trading strategy like that of Gatev et al. (2006) shows that funds that load significantly on the pairs trading strategy show the effect all the stronger, while the effect partly disappears for funds that do not load on pairs trading.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 performs timeseries regressions of market exposure and liquidity. Section 4 explores the results when we select funds based on their exposure to a dynamic trading stratey. Section 5 checks the robustness for 2003 as a break point in hedge fund systematic market exposures.
Section 6 concludes.
Data
For the hedge fund returns we use monthly returns and asset values of individual hedge funds from the Lipper TASS database as provided by Thomson Reuters. We use both live and graveyard funds. We follow the convention of starting in the year 1994, to avoid the most serious measurement biases, see Fung and Hsieh (2002) . Our sample period is January 1994 until April 2009.
We apply the following filter to the individual funds. We discard funds that do not report in US-dollars, have assets below $10 million or have less than 24 consecutive months of data. We discard the first 12 months to account for backfill-bias. Unless stated otherwise, we select hedge funds from the style classifications 'Equity Market
Neutral' and 'Long/Short Equity Hedge', so that our selection includes the US-equity market as primary focus.
For stock market index-returns we use the monthly total return on the S&P 500, S&P 
where R t is the hedge fund portfolio return in month t, r m,t the return on the market and F t,k are the returns on the 7-factor model of Fung and Hsieh (2004) augmented by innovations in illiquidity to account for priced liquidity risk. The time-variation in β t is captured by
where ILLIQ t is Amihud's (2002) illiquidity measure and V IX t the CBOE VIX index.
Including the latter makes sense when we want to account for the fact that market exposure might be related to investor risk aversion, which is captured by the VIX. We measure overall stock market illiquidity as the per-stock ILLIQ-measure, weighted by market capitalization, as in
where N is the number of stocks in month t, M t is the market capitalization at the end of month t and M 0 is the market cap at the beginning of the sample period. ILLIQ i,t is the ILLIQ measure for stock i in month t and is estimated as reversal as a fraction of signed volume, and is negative, see Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) . The higher (less negative) γ is, the more liquid a stock is. We use the PS measure as provided by CRSP.
1 The above defined measure of market liquidity might suffer from outliers: small stocks that have extremely low volumes in one or more days. Acharya and Pedersen (2005) propose the normalized version of ILLIQ:
i.e., a scaled version of ILLIQ with a maximum of 30. The results remain qualitatively unchanged and are not reported in the current version in the paper for brevity. Panel A of Table 2 shows that for the whole sample period, the interaction term of market times illiquidity is positive and significant. Thus a positive shock in aggregate market illiquidity leads to an increase in the market exposure of hedge fund portfolios.
This finding is robust to adding the VIX index as a factor driving the time variations of market betas, as well as to the inclusion of innovations in liquidity, which are known to be priced in the cross-section of hedge fund returns. Further, the presence of illiquid holdings in hedge fund portfolios could potentially bias the market beta estimates, thus we also correct for this by including two lags of the market return in the regres- the role of hedge funds that "If anything, it appears that the top ten hedge funds were buying into the Ringgit as it fell in the late summer and early fall of 1997".
Panel C of Table 2 shows that, after 2003, the relationship between market betas and illiquidity is significantly negative. This is evidence of a liquidity timing interpretation of hedge funds' behavior, as in Cao et al. (2009) and Ben-David et al. (2010) . An equivalent typology is that of demanding liquidity: hedge funds are more active in the market in times of high liquidity.
Hedge fund returns are known to exhibit significant serial correlation due to illiquid holdings in hedge fund strategies or smoothing of reported returns on the part of hedge fund managers (e.g. Getmansky et al. (2004)). We partially correct for the market beta bias induced by return smoothing by including lagged market returns in the regression model. Further, we also proceed by unsmoothing hedge fund returns following the methodology introduced in Amvella et al. (2010) . It has the advantage of not imposing the same order of serial correlation for all return series, as it applies the appropriate unsmoothing profile for each fund. As well, it relies on a method of moments approach and thus does not impose assumptions on the distribution of hedge fund returns. Results for unsmoothed returns are reported in Table 3 . Our previous finding still holds: hedge fund managers display a significant liquidity timing ability in the most recent period after 2003, while their market exposure remains significantly positively related to illiquidity prior to that.
[ INSERT Table 3 HERE ] An additional test is provided by performing individual fund regressions. We first split all hedge funds in our sample in three subsamples, based on their exposure to a large-, small-and mid-cap market index, as proxied by S&P 500, S&P 600 and S&P
Selection of the index associated with each fund is based on Akaike's Information
Criterion (AIC). We impose the additional requirement that each fund has at least 24 consecutive observations of return history, after eliminating the first 12 observations to mitigate backfilling bias. We then estimate our time-series model for each fund in the sample, using the corresponding market factor for each fund. The ILLIQ factor is also computed using the constituents of either S&P 500, S&P 600 or S&P 400. Results are presented in Table 4 where we show the average coefficient and t-statistic for the interaction term of market times ILLIQ for the individual fund regressions on the risk factors. We also report the cross-sectional t-statistic to measure whether the average loading over the funds in the sample is significantly different from zero, as in Chordia et al. (2000), Sadka (2009) .
[ INSERT Table 4 HERE ]
Panel A of Table 4 shows a negative coefficient on the interaction for the full sample period. Also, the cross-sectional t-statistic has a large negative value, suggesting that the average coefficient is negative. However, there is a large heterogeneity between funds: 
Time-varying market exposures through dynamic trading strategies
The reversal found in the systematic exposure to the stock market around 2003 could be caused by a number of factors. But foremost, it is a feature of the returns data of hedge funds. Since we know that hedge funds employ dynamic strategies, we test whether hedge funds that load significantly on returns to dynamic strategies are also more likely to show the reversal in market exposure.
Specifically, we are constructing the returns to a momentum strategy and a pairs trading strategy. We know that timing strategies that exploit momentum and reversal effects generate time-varying exposures to risk factors, see Blitz et al. (2011) , so the use of these strategies by hedge funds might indicate which funds have a time-varying market exposure that is related to market liquidity.
The momentum strategy exploits the momentum in stock returns, i.e., the persistence in performance of past winners and losing stocks, see Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) , Korajczyk and Sadka (2004) . Returns to strategies that exploit momentum seem to deliver an excess return when correcting for systematic risk, found for several other stock markets and are present for most time periods. Here, we take the Fama-French momentum factor as provided by Kenneth French on his website.
The other strategy we consider, pairs trading, is a Wall Street quantitative investment strategy to perform statistical arbitrage between stocks with similar price histories. The strategy is shown to deliver persistent outperformance, correcting for the standard risk factors, see Gatev et al. (2006) and Engelberg et al. (2009) . Pairs trading is also a speculative strategy in the sense that it relies on the implied convergence between prices that share statistical properties, with no particular fundamental reason why they should converge. Hence it is just one of many arbitrage strategies that can be employed by hedge funds. However, since it is well-known and straightforward to implement, we take the setup of Gatev et al. to mimic the typical return on a hedge fund trading strategy. We then form portfolios of hedge funds based on their exposure to the pairs trading return and estimate their conditional market exposure.
We generate pairs trading-returns along the line of Gatev et al. (2006) and give a short summary here. The full description is in the appendix. At the beginning of each month, we rank pairs of stocks from the NYSE-Amex-NASDAQ universe based on the sum of squared deviations of the normalized price indices over the past 12 months (the formation period). Only stocks with a full price history over the formation period are considered. This list of pairs is monitored during a period of six months (trading period) to detect a widening between prices of more than two standard deviations.
The day after such an event, the pair is 'opened' by going one dollar short in the (2004) show that hedge funds were invested in technology stocks in the same proportion as the market portfolio. Second, we put in two modeling assumptions on the extent to which pairs trading is employed by the hedge fund sector:
at the beginning of a six-month trading period, the manager can employ capital equal to five percent of total market volume. On top of that, he can only invest a maximum of 40% of a pair's total dollar volume in a pair. These assumptions reflect the fact that (i) capital involved in pairs trading depends on total market volume, and (ii) the number of pairs that can be traded depends on the trading volume of the individual stocks. Bid-ask spreads, trading costs and the price-impact of trading are likely to increase with the decrease of trading volume. In all, these assumptions transform the pairs trading portfolio return into a strategy return that shares some of the features of an industry-wide return to pairs trading. Third, to capture the effect of illiquid stocks in the pairs-trading portfolios, we also consider a strategy where infrequently traded stocks, i.e., those without a full price history, are allowed to be selected for the pairs. with highest PESPR and including stocks with an incomplete price history. Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics of the momentum strategy and the four pairs-trading strategies.
[ INSERT Table 5 HERE ] In order to analyze these dynamic trading strategies as a potential source of time variations in the market exposure of hedge fund returns, induced by changes in market illiquidity, we look at whether hedge fund returns load significantly on them. Results are presented in Table 6 , which reports the number and average size of significant loadings of hedge funds on the dynamic strategy return.
[ INSERT Table 6 HERE ] The momentum strategy, as well as the original pairs trading strategy proposed by Gatev et al. (2006) , appear to be significant only for less than 15% of all funds in our sample. However, around 60% of the funds load significantly on the three modified pairs trading strategies, while about 24% load positively, but insignificantly. Only 4% have a negative and significant loading on pairs trading. Thus, our pairs trading return seems to capture a systematic element in the variation of hedge fund returns. This is not surprising, given that the motivation and implementation of the pairs trading strategy is mimicking industry practice, albeit in a stylized and non-sophisticated way, see Gatev et al. (2006) . We therefore use the two pairs-trading strategies that allow for a flexible number of traded pairs in our subsequent analysis. The modified strategy that uses a fixed number of pairs for trading yields similar results that we do not report for brevity.
To see whether the liquidity effect found above is related to pairs trading, we now use the pairs trading return to sort hedge funds into portfolios. The first portfolio consists of hedge funds that load positively and significantly on the pairs trading return. The second portfolio consists of hedge funds that have an insignificant, but positive loading on the pairs trading return. The third portfolio consists of hedge funds that have no significant loading on pairs trading. We then regress each portfolio on the market return and the interaction term of market times illiquidity, controlling for the other risk factors, as in Table 2 . Table 7 has the results for the pairs-trading strategy "PTflexible", Table 8 for the strategy "PT-illiquid". Only the coefficients for the market return and the interaction term are shown.
[ INSERT Table 7 HERE ] [ INSERT Table 8 HERE ] The "All funds" columns of Table 7 show the familiar result of a switch in the loading on the interaction term: positive before 2003 and negative after. The same result is found in the columns "PT-exposed funds", with a slightly smaller (less positive) loading before 2003, but more negative after the break. For the non PT-exposed funds, however, we see a striking deviation from earlier results: there is no positive loading on the interaction term before the break, and a non-significant negative loading after the break. For the funds with negative PT-exposure, only the negative loadings after the break are significant. Thus, sorting on pairs-trading exposure selects funds that do, and do not exhibit a switching behavior with respect to the interaction term of market and illiquidity.
The results in Table 8 are based on exposure to a pairs-trading strategy that is explicitly skewed towards less liquid stocks to capture a possible liquidity effect caused by the selection of stocks. The result are qualitatively the same as in Table 8 : the portfolio with PT-exposed funds are very similar to the All-funds portfolio, but the portfolio with non PT-exposed funds does not show the significant switch over the 2003 breakpoint.
The same holds for the portfolio with funds that have a negative PT-exposure.
With respect to both Table 7 
How unique is 2003?
Motivated by the introduction of Autoquote on NYSE in 2003 and the dramatic improvement in liquidity that followed we have split our sample in June 2003. However, we want to test the sensitivity of our results to the exact date of the breakpoint.
In order to test for fund-specific breakpoints, we perform a changepoint regression on individual funds, as in Bollen and Whaley (2009) and Patton and Ramadorai (2010).
It starts from a a general model for individual hedge fund returns with time-varying exposures, as in
where R it is the return of hedge fund i in month t, r m,t the return on the market and F t,k are the returns on the 7-factor model of Fung and Hsieh (2004) . The time-variation in β it is specified as
where 1 {A} is the indicator function for event A and τ i is the change-point for fund i.
We can combine equations (7) and (8) into one regression as
For every fund, the model in Equation (9) is estimated for every change-point τ i .
The optimal change-point τ * i is the one that minimizes the sum of squared errors over all candidate change-points. Since the model is estimated for every change-point, we cannot use standard coefficient tests. Therefore, we test for significance by using a bootstrap procedure, see Patton and Ramadorai (2010) and Bollen and Whaley (2009) .
It is a two-stage procedure that consists first in estimating a constant parameter model under the null of no significant change-point, i.e., a constant parameter model with
We then draw bootstrap samples of hedge fund returns by re-sampling the residuals and adding them to the fitted return estimates. In order to account for autocorrelation of returns, we follow Patton and Ramadorai (2010) and Politis and Romano (1994) in that we draw the residuals in blocks of random size and starting point. The block lengths are drawn from a geometric distribution. In the second stage, we estimate an optimal change-point regression on each bootstrap sample. For each candidate changepoint we compute the F-statistic of Andrews et al. (1996) :
where SSE * is the sum of squared errors of the estimated constant parameter model, SSE (τ i ) corresponds to the change-point regression for time τ i , and ν equals the number of factors in the change-point regression plus one. The significance of a changepoint τ i is determined by the test statisticF :
computed for equal weights w (τ i ). We consider a change-point parameter shift to be significant for a fund i if itsF i statistic exceeds the 90 th percentile of the distribution of theF statistic.
The funds for which we find a significant changepoint are graphically depicted in Fig Table 2 , where the coefficient estimate is positive and significant for the whole sample as well as the first subperiod.
Panel B of Figure 3 shows how the negative coefficient after the breakpoint is significant for breakpoints after 2001 for the S&P 500 and S&P 400. For the S&P 600 SmallCap the coefficient turns significant after end-1999. For the most early breakpoints the coefficient is positive and significant, corresponding to the positive coefficient for the whole sample in Table 2 .
The fact that significance in Panel A is found only after 2003, and in Panel B before
2001 could indicate that the positive and significant coefficients of Panel A and Table 2 are measuring a weaker effect, for which a longer data series is necessary. On the other hand, we should take into account that over the breakpoint date, all exposures are allowed to change, including the loading on the market index itself.
[ INSERT Figure 4 here ]
The difference between the Small Cap and the other markets disappear if we restrict the sample to funds that load significantly on the PT-illiquid strategy. Figure 4 shows the evolution of t-statistics over breakpoint dates when we restrict funds to only those that load on PT-illiquid, as in Table 8 . In the figure, the lines for the respective markets are much closer together than in Figure 3 . This is a result of the narrower selection of fund, filtering out funds that, according to Table 8 , display no switching behavior in the interaction term of the market and illiquidity. In all, both Figures 3 and Figure 4 confirm a significant structural shift in parameters for the dynamic loading of hedge funds on the stock market around 2003, caused by market liquidity.
Conclusion
In this paper we document a shift in systematic stock market exposure of hedge funds, The return on the portfolio of pairs is calculated as the return on invested capital, giving equal weights on all pairs selected for trading. Daily returns are compounded in order to obtain monthly returns. At the start of each month m a new pairs-trading strategy is started, so that we obtain a series of six overlapping portfolio returns on strategies, each starting one month apart. The pairs-trading strategy return is the monthly average of the six running portfolio returns. (2002) measure of liquidity, mkt is the return on the value-weighted CRSP return, mkt*L is the interaction term of the market return with the (il)liquidity measure, VIX is the CBOE implied volatility index, mkt t-1, mkt t-2 are the one and two-month lagged market returns, smb is the Fama-French small-minus-big factor, yldchange is the change in the term spread, def is default spread, ptfsbd, ptfsfx and ptfscom are the bond, currency and commodity timing factors from Fung and Hsieh (2004) as provided by David Hsieh on his website, ∆L is the innovations in the corresponding liquidity factor. Newey-West t-statistics between parentheses and *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%-level, respectively. Descriptive statistics of monthly excess returns to the dynamic strategies for the period January 1994 to April 2009. "MOM-FF" is the return to momentum, i.e., the return on the long portfolio of past 12-month winning stocks minus the return on the past 12-month losing stocks, as provided by Kenneth French on his website. "PT-original" is the pairs trading strategy from Gatev et al. (2006), exploiting temporary deviations in the stock price-paths of the top-20 of matching pairs of stock. "PT-modified" is a modification whereby the funds not invested in pairs are assumed to be invested in the S&P 500 index future. "PT-flexible" is a modification where we take the total hedge fund industry size as starting assets and restrict pairs trading to a maximum of 40% of the dollar volume of each stock, with total pairs trading volume a maximum of 5% of the total market dollar volume at the end of each month. There is no restriction on the number of traded pairs. The remaining assets not invested in pairs trading are invested in the S&P 500. "PT-illiquid" is the strategy where stocks with an incomplete price history are allowed and those with high effective spreads are selected. It restricts pairs trading to a maximum of 40% of the dollar volume of each stock, with total pairs trading volume a maximum of 1% of the total market dollar volume at the end of each month. Stocks considered for the pairs trading are all from the NYSE-Amex universe as provided in the CRSP daily stock file. This table reports the outcome of a time-series regression. Dependent variable is the return on the value-weighted portfolio of funds sorted on exposure to the pairs trading return "PT-flexible". "All funds" is the portfolio with hedge funds with styles Long/Short Equity (LSE) and Equity Market Neutral (EMN). "PT-exposed funds" is the subset of the all-funds portfolio that includes only funds which have a significant positive loading on the return to the pairs trading strategy, "non PT-exposed" is the portfolio with the funds with insignificant positive exposure and 'negative PT-exposure' is for funds with negative exposure to the pair-trading return. R m is the market return, R m × ILLIQ is the interaction term of the market return with Amihud's illiquidity measure. Included, but not reported are the hedge fund risk factors as in Table 2 . T-statistics are between parentheses, based on heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-corrected standard errors. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%-level, respectively.
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All funds PT-exposed funds non PT-exposed This table reports the outcome of a time-series regression. Dependent variable is the return on the value-weighted portfolio of funds sorted on exposure to the pairs trading return "PT-illiquid". This is the strategy where funds with an incomplete return history and the highest spreads are selected for the pairs. "All funds" is the portfolio with hedge funds with styles Long/Short Equity (LSE) and Equity Market Neutral (EMN). "PT-exposed funds" is the subset of the all-funds portfolio that includes only funds which have a significant positive loading on the return to the pairs trading strategy, "non PT-exposed" is the portfolio with the funds with insignificant positive exposure and 'negative PT-exposure' is for funds with negative exposure to the pair-trading return. R m is the market return, R m × ILLIQ is the interaction term of the market return with Amihud's illiquidity measure. Included, but not reported are the hedge fund risk factors as in Table 2 . T-statistics are between parentheses, based on heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-corrected standard errors. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%-level, respectively.
All funds PT-exposed funds non PT-exposed negative PT-exposure This graph shows the t-values for the interaction term of ILLIQ times the market for a given date that splits up the sample. Panel A has the t-values for the sample before the end date on the x-axis. Panel B has the t-values for the sample after the start date on the x-axis. The solid line represents the results for the portfolio of Long/Short Equity (LSE) and Equity Market Neutral (EMN) hedge funds that are associated with the S&P 500 as the market index, using the AIC selection criterion. In the same way, the dashed line is for the S&P 400 MidCap and the dotted line for the S&P 600 SmallCap index. The regression specification is identical to the one specified in Table 2 , i.e. controlling for the usual risk factors, illiquid holdings with lagged S&P returns and volatility timing with the VIX index. This graph shows the t-values for the interaction term of ILLIQ times the market for a given date that splits up the sample. Panel A has the t-values for the sample before the end date on the x-axis. Panel B has the t-values for the sample after the start date on the x-axis. The solid line represents the results for the portfolio of Long/Short Equity (LSE) and Equity Market Neutral (EMN) hedge funds that have a significant exposure to the pairs trading return "PT-illiquid", i.e. the strategy where funds with an incomplete return history and the highest spreads are selected for the pairs. The solid line corresponds to the S&P 500 as the market index, the dashed line -to the S&P 400 MidCap and the dotted line -to the S&P 600 SmallCap index. The regression specification is identical to the one specified in Table 2 , i.e. controlling for the usual risk factors, illiquid holdings with lagged S&P returns and volatility timing with the VIX index.
